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Abstract: - This paper shows the first result obtained in the application of economic mechanisms for the efficient 
assignment of resources in communication networks. The final objective is to determine which Service Provider 
will carry their traffic over the network of a Network Provider, which will be the most profitable route and which 
price the ISPs will pay for it to the Network provider. As the price is a key driver a good approach to select the 
ISP may be an auction mechanism. The implementation of these kind of auction mechanisms becomes a NP 
complete problem which is solved in this paper using novel metaheuristics, specifically a genetic algorithm. 
 
Key-Words: - Communication networks, resource assignment, auctions mechanisms, BGP protocol, QoS 
provision. 
 
1   Introduction 
 
Saying that Internet traffic is growing at a very high 
rate is not a novelty. Neither that one of the most 
important challenge for the new services which 
generate that traffic is the Quality of Service (QoS). 
The QoS features of the transmission over IP will 
allow the deployment of high speed real time data 
services as the well known Voice over IP VoIP [1] or 
the Video on Demand. QoS depends on several 
factors but we have to remark mainly three, 
bandwidth, delay and jitter [2].  These factors are 
deeply related and can be jointly seen as the problem 
of traffic congestion.  
 
Pricing has appeared as a very suitable way to avoid 
congestion through the control of the user demand. 
The basis of this method consists of the assignment of 
the network resources to the users that values them 
most, that is, to the users that are willing to pay more 
for them, see [3]. 
 
Auctions are a very common way to implement 
pricing and economic policies. An auction rule is 
characterized by an allocation rule, which defines 
how the resources are shared between the winner 
users, and a pricing scheme, which defines the 
associated imposed costs. 
 
Auctioning can be applied to networking problems in 
two different levels: 
End User Level: In this environment the user 
competes by the access to a specific network resource 
related with the QoS, in most cases in the access link 
of the network, see [4]. Another scenario in the end 
user level is when instead of competing for the 
access, the user competes by a complete network 
route through several links. In this last case the 
selection auction mechanism becomes more critical 
because it has direct influence in the final route of the 
traffic and also in the whole QoS. This kind of issues 
can be considered as Intradomain problems because 
we are studying the network of a single 
administrative entity (only a network operator). 
 
Internet Service Provider Level: Telecommunication 
network market has been involved in a liberalization 
process during last decade. Therefore several Service 
and Network providers have entered the market. 
From the routing point of view the whole Internet can 
be considered as a set of independent connected 
domains, named Autonomous Systems (AS), each 
one under the different administrations and with 
different routing policies, see Figure 1. The routing 
information about possible paths between AS is 
propagated by the Border Gatewaty Protocol (BGP). 
The problem on this level consists if the way to select 
the path from the origin AS to the destiny, satisfying 
some QoS. Note that each AS can assure the QoS in 
his own network and in their neighbors (by direct 
agreement) but it has no control with the second level 
neighbors. In this line, pricing mechanisms may 
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provide feasible solutions, see [5]. The previous 
description is named as Interdomain routing problem 






Figure 1: Interdomain Routing Level between 
Autonomous System (AS) 
 
Two different types of solutions have been proposed 
for the QoS routing based on economic mechanisms, 
centralized and distributed approaches. The 
centralized view considers a single entity which 
performs a global decision about which demands will 
be served and which route they will go through. This 
means that the auction mechanism is executed once 
for the whole network. Obviously it is used in 
Intradomain routing problems, because it is non sense 
to apply it when multiple administrative entities plays 
the game. Distributed view considers that in each 
link, i.e. in each interface between two different 
network nodes or AS, an auction have to be 
performed in order to select the most suitable path.  
 
We focus on the Intradomain routing under a 
centralized point of view. In this paper we show the 
firs result of applying modern heuristic, specifically 
genetic algorithms, to route problem solving using 
auction mechanism.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the 
second section we describe the general Intradomain 
routing problem related with the auction theory. Next, 
we introduce the general genetic algorithm and the 
concrete formulation of the problem. Section 4 shows 
the result obtained in several scenarios and finally 
section 6, explains the conclusions and future 
worklines. 
 
2   Auctions Applied to Intradomain 
Routing. 
 
We tackle the following problem for Intradomain 
routing. Consider an established network topology. 
Consider also that there are several user-customer 
demands which have to be routed from a determined 
origin point of the network Noi to an end point Ndi 
requiring some capacity qi. The problem appears 
when the capacity of the links is not enough to carry 
all the demands. Each user-customer, is willing to 
pay a maximum price per capacity unit pi. Figure 2 
shows an scheme of the described situation 
 
The network Provider will tender the capacities of his 
network links to the user-customer using some 
auction procedures in order to obtain the maximum 
revenue. Note further that the origin and destiny 
nodes may be not directly connected, so it is possible 
that a specific demand has to travel through several 
network links. Therefore the same demand has to win 
several auctions in order to reach its destiny. To get 
the problem harder, there is not a single demand path 
from an origin to a destiny because the network 





Figure 2: General scheme of the Intradomain routing 
problem. 
 
Therefore we have to tackle three complexity 
increasing problems. 
 
1. Solve the capacity assignment for a single 
link, 
2. For each demand in the network define a 
single origin-destiny route and find the whole 
configuration, that is, which demand are 
carried (and which not) and the revenue of 
the service provider. 
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3. Define multiple paths for the demands and 
find the optimum configuration. 
 
In this paper we will focus on the first problem. 
Network resources, composed of many links with 
different bandwidths can be considered as multiple 
items (links) with multiple units (bandwidth units). A 
simultaneous ascending auction is known to be an 
effective approach. However its main disadvantage is 
that it can give raise to a free rider problem among 
the customers. To avoid this, it is better to apply 
simultaneous one-round auctions, which technical 
name is “sealed bid auction”s. Next we state the 
mathematical formulation of the problem. 
 
Consider i=1…M user-customers competing for the 
bandwidth of a link with capacity Q. The social 
welfare is given by ∑
i
iθ , where θi is the valuation 
function of the user also named willingness to pay 
function. 
 
Therefore we have to design a mechanism to 
compute a feasible solution a(θ) for the assignment 
of capacity qi to the user i which fulfils 
Qq
i
i ≤∑ ,and maximizes the social welfare. 
 
Obviously the users have to pay some reward to the 
network provider, that is, to the owner of the link. 
The definition of the price is a very complicated 
problem. A current trend is based on using some 
economic mechanism like the auction, specifically 
generalized Vickrey auctions [6]. Under a Vickrey 
auction, the price paid for each user ci, is the loss of 
declared welfare he imposes to the others users due 
to his presence in the auction and is defined by the 
following equation. 
 

















This expression requires further explanation: To 
calculate the price ci for the user i we remove him 
from the list of bidders. Then we calculate a new 
optimal assignment of capacity (xj) to the rest of 
bidders, and therefore we compute the price they bid 
using their valuation function θi (note that this 
procedure requires solving a NP-hard problem 
similar to the original one, but removing one  
variable). The result of this calculation is the first 
term of the equation. The second term is calculated 
using the initial solution a(θ) and computing the total 
amount of bids, excluding the one which corresponds 
to the user i. 
 
It is straight forward to see that the price paid by the 
user i is always less or equal than the bid they offer 
for the amount of bandwidth θi. 
 
Vickrey Auction is a useful mechanism, because it 
satisfies the following conditions, [7]: 
 
1. Incentive compatibility: For each user, 
bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy. 
This means that the valuation function they 
present to the auctioneer is the real function. 
 
2. Individual rationality: Each truthful player 
obtains a non-negative utility. The utility of 
each user is defined 
by: ( ) ( ) iiii cacaU −= θ,  
 
Note that a is the solution found, that is the 
capacity assigned to each user. 
 
3. Efficiency: Social welfare is maximized 
 
Of course this mechanism has some clear 
disadvantages. In [8] it is stated the Vickrey auction 
mechanism is hard to compute even for simple 
problems. For a first step we are going to reduce the 
model considering inelastic demand, which means a 





Figure 3: Inelastic Demand Function 
 
In this case even if the price paid by each user ci is 
null, the problem of maximizing the social welfare 
under link capacity constraints, Q, is NP-complete, in 
fact it is the classical  “knapsack problem”.  
 
Several algorithms have been proposed to solve the 
knapsack problem, see [8] and [9] as an example. We 
introduce a genetic algorithm seeking for a more 
general procedure which will allow us to expand it to 
consider elastic demand with ci no null. 
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3   Genetic Algorithm for the First 
Price Sealed Bid Auction. 
 
Genetic algorithms are robust problem's solving 
techniques based on natural evolution processes. 
They are population-based techniques which codify a 
set of possible solutions to the problem, and evolve it 
through the application of the so called genetic 
operators [10]. The standard genetic operators in a 
GA are: 
 
Selection: where the individuals of a new population 
are selected from the old one. In the standard 
implementation of the Selection operator, each 
individual has a probability of surviving for the next 
generation proportional to its associated fitness 
value (roulette wheel). 
 
Crossover: where new individuals are searched 
starting from couples of individuals in the population. 
Once the couples are randomly selected, the 
individuals have the possibility of swapping parts of 
themselves with its couple, the probability. Tthis 
happens is usually called crossover probability, Pc.  
 
Mutation: where new individuals are searched by 
randomly changing bits of current individuals with a 
low probability Pm (probability of mutation). 
 
Genetic algorithm works as follows, see Figure 4: 
 
1. Generate the initial population, usually 
randomly. Each individual of the population 
is named gene and it is a chain of binary 
values named chromosome. Each gene is a 
feasible solution of the problem, fair or bad, 
which has to be evaluated 
 
2. Calculate the fitness function of each gene. 
The fitness function is the objective value 
which measures the goodness or badness of 
each solution-gene of the population. 
 
3. Apply the operators defined above. 
 
4. Evaluate the fitness of the new population 
generated by the Selection-Crossover-
Mutation operators. 
 
5. Repeat the process for all generations 








To apply the genetic algorithm to the knapsack 
problem we consider the following codification for 

















Therefore the knapsack problem is defined as finding 



















The equation above is the fitness function we are 
going to use for the genetic algorithm. Note that the 
genetic operators (Selection-Crossover-Mutation) 
may produce a number of xi=1 in a gene which does 
not satisfy the capacity constraint. Hence we need to 
apply a restriction operator to limit the number of 
xi=1 in the individual. This is implemented as a 
randomly remover of user in the system. 
 
4   Experiments and results 
 
We have performed a large number of experiments 
with the genetic algorithm but for the sake of 
simplicity we will show a subset of two. The first one 
is a very simple case which allows us a better 
understanding of the knapsack problem. This 
example has been used as a test for our algorithm. 
The number of users, the capacity requirements and 
the bids are shown in Table I 
 













1 1 1 11 1 1 
2 1 1 12 1 1 
3 1 1 13 1 1 
4 1 1 14 1 1 
5 1 1 15 1 1 
6 1 1 16 1 1 
7 1 1 17 1 1 
8 1 1 18 1 1 
9 1 1 19 1 1 
10 1 1 20 20 20 
 
Table I: Input values for experiment 1 
 
The parameters of the genetic algorithm are: 
 
 Population: The number of independent and 
feasible solutions that the genetic algorithm 
uses to evolve towards the optimal solution: 
101 
 Generations: Number of iterations, 100. 
 We are going to use the concept named 
elitism which means that the best individual 
is granted to be in the next generation 
 
The capacity of the link is set to 20 units. Under the 
established condition ci=0 , the optimal solution is to 
assign all the capacity to the last user to maximize the 
social welfare, ∑
i
iθ , that is, the final solution: 
 
{ }1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0)( =θa  
 
Second example is a, let say, real situation. In this 
case we have 17 users with different requirements in 














1 2 5 11 11 11 
2 6 9 12 14 13 
3 9 11 13 7 9 
4 10 16 14 5 6 
5 21 12 15 6 14 
6 26 28 16 2 17 
7 8 40 17 3 8 
8 5 21    
9 14 13    
10 16 9    
 
Table II: Input values for experiment 2 
 
The genetic algorithm parameters and the link 
capacity are the same that for experiment 1.The result 
is the following assigment vector: 
 
 
{ }0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1)( =θa  
 
And the result of the social welfare is 91. In the 
Figure 5 you can see the evolution of the social 
welfare through the generations. 
 

















Figure 5: Evolution of the social welfare through the 
generations 
 
Note that the optimum value is obtained before 50 % 
of generations have passed 
 
 
5   Conclusion 
 
We have presented here an algorithm for solving the 
knapsack problem applied to a Firs Price Sealed Bid 
Auction in a communication network link. The 
algorithm is based in modern heuristics, specifically 
genetic algorithms. The algorithm has demonstrated a 
very good performance both in the goodness of the 
solution obtained as well as in computational time. 
These features make it a very good candidate to try to 
solve much more complex problems related with 
Vickrey Auctions with ci no null. 
 
The future work is related with the establishment of 
the complete route of a specific service demand in a 
Intradomain environment. For this purpose the 
algorithm developed may be a good candidate due to 
its low computational load. 
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